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Abstract 
There is a distinction between commonly known truth and truth as established for 
legal purposes. The latter requires proof. This distinction between ordinary truth 
and legal truth is available to speakers as a discursive resource (although 
differently available in different cultures). In this paper, after a brief discussion of 
some matters relating to evidence, proof, and truth, I analyze a short, generic 
story told by a lawyer in the Federal Trade Commission, in which the 
representatives of companies allegedly violating the law say ‘‘You can’t prove it.’’ 
The violation is relatively minor and there is some controversy about whether to 
include the charge in the case. The story, I argue, provides a motivation which 
goes beyond the strictly legal. The company representatives capitalize on the 
distinction between ‘‘mere truth’’ and legally established truth. I conclude with a 
discussion of the place of proof---the word, its variants, and the things which 
constitute proof---in conversation, including a discussion of sequential placement, 
deniability, nonverbal signals and implicature, and a distinction between ‘‘official’’ 
and ‘‘unofficial’’ communication. It is the disparity between their official and 
unofficial stances that gives the company representatives’ behavior its distinctive 
interactional force. 
Keywords: Narrative; Truth; Proof; Implicature; Conversation analysis; Federal 
Trade Commission 
 
 
1.  TRUTH AND PROOF 
Legal truth in modern societies is established through a formalized 
process, constrained by rules of evidence and court procedures, and filtered 
through lawyers' jargon. These legal levees secure the courtroom from the 
undisciplined flow of worldly chatter.  Truth does not leak in from the outside; it 
must be internally produced.  A claim that might be true for some or all other 
practical purposes may not be true for judicial purposes.  "Mere truth" is 
legitimized and made official by being proven in a legally acceptable manner.  
The existence of this distinction between mere truth and legally-recognized truth 
presents speakers with a new discursive resource.  They can now, if they wish, 
depict a state of affairs as factual and yet not true for legal purposes.  Such a 
depiction has its interactional uses; among them, as we shall see, challenge and 
derision.  That which is asserted but not yet true for legal purposes is that which 
must be proven.  "You can't prove it" becomes the motto of the defiantly guilty, 
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the taunt of those sheltered safely behind the barriers of the legal system.  At 
issue is not what is known but what can be proven in court. 
There is a third category of truth—"actual" truth—that is worth mentioning 
as a point of reference.  Actual truth is what is objectively, ultimately true.  Some 
post-modernists, of course, have questioned the very notion of actual truth, 
suggesting that truth is always and inevitably culturally relative.  There is no need 
to take a position on this matter here; the concept of actual truth is all we need 
for present purposes.  The process of establishing legal truth is an ordered  
attempt to achieve actual truth.  Mere truth is an assumption that what we "know" 
is indeed actual truth.  So, I am not claiming that mere truth is (actually) true, but 
only that it is generally accepted as true. 
My interest here is in discourse, interaction, and narrative.  The formal 
relation between truth and proof is not my primary subject matter, nor is the legal 
relation between proof and evidence.  Philosophy and jurisprudence lie outside 
my field of competence.  Nevertheless, the story we will examine is intelligible 
only by reference to the abstract relations of truth, proof, and evidence, and so 
that is where we will begin. 
We need first to specify certain logical relations between truth and proof.  
These relations are generally understood, and form the basis for our talk on 
these matters. 
1. If a proposition, p, is proven, then it is true.  It follows that, if p is untrue, 
it is not proven. 
2. It does not follow that, if p is true, it is proven, although it may be. It 
does not follow that, if p is unproven, it is untrue, although it may be. 
3. If p might be untrue, then it is necessarily unproven.  
From a discursive point of view, these principles may be viewed as rules 
for speaking.  So, one could not literally say "It is proven, but false."  Of course, 
one could say "It is 'proven', but false."  The scare quotes around "proven" 
suggest a nonliteral usage (something like "falsely thought to be proven") and 
would be expressed in speech by features of articulation and/or by further 
explanation.  These logical principles are constantly invoked in proof talk, 
although usually not made explicit.  Although they may be topicalized, as I have 
done here, they are ordinarily unstated conditions for intelligible talk. 
The passage from "mere truth" to legally proven truth requires clear, 
irrefutable, and conclusive evidence that the proposition is true.  "Conclusive" 
evidence is not merely demonstrably true in itself (i.e., irrefutable) but sufficient to 
establish that p, the central and crucial accusation, is true beyond a reasonable 
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doubt.  One might, for example, be able to demonstrate, irrefutably, that 
Reverend Green was present at the scene of a murder without showing beyond a 
doubt that he was the murderer. After all, Colonel Mustard and Professor Plum 
were also present.  In such a case, the evidence against Reverend Green in 
relation to the allegation that he is the murderer, is not conclusive. Argument 
from intuition, hearsay, personal experience, anecdote, or (sometimes) common 
sense will not do for purposes of legal proof.1 
Not all evidence which is legally dispositive (i.e., sufficient for purposes of 
reaching a legal decision), however, constitutes proof.  In the American system, 
there are three standards of evidence, each sufficient for certain purposes.  The 
least stringent standard is "preponderance of evidence."  This is the standard 
which is often applied in civil cases.  Evidence which is dispositive under this 
standard will not necessarily constitute proof in the usual sense of the word (i.e., 
a clear and reasonably certain demonstration of truth).2  The next level is "clear 
and convincing evidence." The most stringent standard, for legal purposes, that 
which is applied in criminal cases, is the "reasonable doubt" criterion.  Beyond 
that is absolute certainty (if such a thing is possible), but that has no application 
in the legal system.  To say that something is proven would seem to require, both 
in common and legal usage, and in my own present usage, that its truth be 
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.3  And when I say that proof requires 
conclusive evidence, I mean evidence that achieves this standard, as against 
evidence which might be legally dispositive under, say, a preponderance-of-
evidence standard. 
This brief discussion of the logical semantics of truth and proof and the 
legal standards of evidence, has been abstract, without context, and without 
                                                
1 This account is a somewhat idealized.  In practice, common sense, in particular, 
often plays a part in court proceedings and deliberations.   In fact, legal proof 
itself rests on a basis of common sense; this is implicit in the very concept of 
"reasonable" doubt (Gluckman 1963).  Also, attribution of motive, frequently an 
important element in court cases, is pretty much a common sensical operation 
2 In law, proof is sometimes considered to be any evidence carrying probative 
weight; thus, perhaps, less certain than proof in the sense in which I am using 
the word.  In such a case, it may be that the claim that an item of evidence is 
"proof" would not be equivalent to stating that the matter is proven.  
3 Proof, according to Miriam Webster online, is "The cogency of evidence that 
compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact." 
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interactional content.  It provides only an initial basis for the analysis to follow, 
which is of an actual event, a story told by an attorney in the United States 
Federal Trade Commission.  My interest is not in proof as a formal concept but in 
proof as an item of discourse, deployed as a functioning element of practical talk.  
 
2.  THE CHARGE 
For three months in 1977 and five more in 1982, I studied, as an 
ethnographer, the life and work of a division of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission.4  I observed the lawyers and other staff at work, did interviews, 
helped with simple tasks, ate lunch with them and participated in social events, 
and, most importantly, attended and recorded meetings among the staff 
attorneys.  On two occasions, I was present at meetings between staff attorneys 
and company representatives (also attorneys).  I also interviewed various 
persons in other divisions and at higher levels of the FTC bureaucracy.  This 
paper is, in large part, an account of a small section of a lengthy meeting among 
division lawyers.  The participants are, in order of authoriity, Helen, the director of 
the division, Ben, the assistant director, Paula, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
"program director" in the division, and Mary and Judy, staff attorneys.  They are 
discussing the draft of a memo charging the XYZ Loan Company with violations 
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its associated regulations and outlining 
the case against the company.  The memo will be sent on to the next level of the 
agency, the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and 
eventually, if it is approved by the Director and the Commission, form the basis of 
either a consent order with the company, involving penalties and prescriptions for 
future behavior, or, if no agreement can be reached, litigation. 
The issue currently under discussion is the company's violation of a rule 
that states that "if an applicant applies for an individual, unsecured account, a 
creditor shall not request the applicant's marital status, unless the applicant 
resides in a community property State or property upon which the applicant is 
relying as a basis for repayment of the credit requested is located in such a 
State" (United States Federal Register 1978: 458).  The division had recently 
carried out an investigation of XYZ, using dummy loan applicants (which they 
                                                
4 For previous publications dealing with this work, see Bilmes 2008, 1995, 1985, 
1981; Bilmes and Woodbury, 1991.  I have also used data from this fieldwork in 
several other articles.  
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referred to as "auditors" or "testers"), that demonstrated that XYZ was violating 
this provision of the regulations, along with several other provisions.  However, a 
controversy had arisen among the division attorneys working on the case as to 
whether to include this violation as a formal charge against the company in the 
case that the division was constructing. 
The argument against including the charge was that it was merely 
"technical," that is, that there was no evidence that the violation had led to 
discrimination or any other harm to consumers.  Various arguments were raised 
in defense of the charge.  One was that there was in fact a kind of injury involved 
in that consumers who were asked about their marital status and subsequently 
denied credit would have no way of knowing that they were not discriminated 
against on this account, and that this uncertainty constituted a psychological 
injury.  Another, perhaps more compelling, argument was that the provision 
against asking about marital status was included precisely because it is difficult 
to prove discrimination directly.  The regulation is meant to relieve the FTC of the 
burden of showing actual harm, by depriving companies of the information 
necessary to discriminate. 
In the discussion at hand (see Appendix), Paula points out that Tim Muris, 
the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, had indicated that he was not 
averse to including "tagalong" issues, that is, charges that were not in 
themselves sufficient on which to base a case, because they do not generate 
clear and direct consumer injury, but which are not "irrelevant," "technical," or 
"picky."  Helen agrees that the violation is "an important element of the case."  It 
is important to prove because it is often difficult to detect.  Paula then says that 
she has "another thought."  She mentions that Ben, the assistant director of the 
division covered it last week.5   Paula goes on to say that "we have a lot of 
                                                
5 Here is the relevant quotation: 
Ben:  the marital status is a little harder because we don't really have any 
evidence: at this point (1) that they're u:sing the marital status to discriminate but 
(1) but (1) w- y'know the question is why: are they asking the marital status (1) 
an:d the answer to that would be: if it's not for secured property they're either 
answer- asking it out of habit (1) or: they're asking it because there's they're 
going to factor it into their considerations (1) of the applicant. 
Helen:  Okay what if we looked at it in in terms of um: 
 (5) 
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experience with circumstantial evidence" but that "this is a unique opportunity (.5) 
it's it's actually (.5) the only way we have of developing: irrefutable evidence that 
this has been going on".  By "the only way," she is referring to the use of the 
testers, who called the company as loan applicants.  Of the 35 "applicants," 24 
were asked about their marital status. 
As the party making the charge, the burden of proof lies with the FTC.  
This, in turn, requires that the agency produce evidence of the violation.6  In 
cases of this sort, the standard, if the case were to go to litigation, is usually 
preponderance-of-evidence (as against the more stringent clear-and-convincing 
or beyond-a-reasonable-doubt criteria).7  Nevertheless, Paula seems to be 
talking about actual, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt proof.  It is not entirely clear to 
me why she should be speaking about proof rather than evidence here.  
Perhaps, in the case of minor charges with little or no apparent consumer injury, 
the standard of evidence is (informally and unofficially) increased.  That is, one, 
in effect, compensates for the inconsequentiality of the charge by providing more 
certain evidence that the violation occurred. 
Paula sets up a contrast between "circumstantial" evidence and 
"irrefutable" evidence.  Although her meaning is clear enough, the terminology, 
as I have already suggested, is a bit imprecise.  Circumstantial evidence can be 
irrefutable.  To return to my earlier example, it may be irrefutably proven that X 
was present at the scene of a murder, but the evidence may be circumstantial as 
regards the charge that X committed the murder.  In the terminology that I have 
suggested, Paula is making a distinction between non-conclusive and conclusive 
                                                                                                                                            
Ben: Oh and the other thing is likelihood of detection on on marital status is real 
low. 
6 It is not required that the company know what its loan officers are doing, that it 
have what Hockett (1960), in another context, calls "total feedback."  It is still 
responsible, through negligence, although actual knowledge might be a taken as 
exacerbated bad faith and thus call for a greater penalty. 
7If the company were being charged with contempt for violation of a prior order 
(civil contempt), the standard would be "clear and convincing," although 
sanctions would be based on preponderance.  For illustrative cases, see FTC v. 
Tashman (2003), FTC v. Chierico et al. (2000), FTC v. Kuykendall (2004).  I am, 
nevertheless, still somewhat uncertain. Paula has said that "we have a lot of 
experience with circumstantial evidence."  This seems to suggest that 
preponderance of evidence is not sufficient in this matter.  Proof is required. 
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evidence, that is, between evidence which merely suggests that a violation has 
occurred and evidence which proves (beyond reasonable doubt) that the 
violation occurred.  The reason for including the charge is not merely that we 
have clear, irrefutable, conclusive evidence of the violation, but that we have not 
been able to produce such evidence in the past.  (For the FTC lawyers, there is a 
special appeal involved in doing something for the first time, for example, 
successfully advancing a new legal interpretation or proving a charge that has 
not been provable in the past.)8  There are two contrasts here: between types of 
evidence and between then and now, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE        
 
 
3.  THE STORY 
At this point, Paula tells her story: 
 
(1) 
1. Paula:  … we've been telling companies that have been    
2.         doing it (.5) for years9 and they keep saying 
3.         nyeh nyeh nyeh you can't prove it because it 
4.         could have been volunteered in ninety nine 
5.         percent of the cases. 
6. ?:      Um hm= 
7. Paula:  =You know we go c'mon it wasn't volunteered and 
8.         they go nyeh nyeh you can't prove it. (.5) well 
                                                
8 From an earlier meeting: 
Paula: …we pursued it in this case because (.5) all –we've never alleged it (.8) 
we belie:ve that it's a common industry practice (.) it's very difficult to pro:ve (.) ... 
we have ((thumps table)) been able to prove it…. 
9 The expression "for years" is ambiguous.  Have we been telling them for years 
or have they been doing it for years?  Given the context, and the .5 second 
pause before "for years," I would favor the former interpretation, although nothing 
of analytical importance seems to ride on the distinction.  At any rate, "we've 
been telling" implies that we told them on several occasions. 
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9.         ahha we proved it. 
 
On its face, this is a dramatization of the points that Paula has already 
made, summarized in Figure 1, but it adds new elements.  Not only did we have 
circumstantial evidence but we have repeatedly told them that they were 
committing a violation (although, as noted in footnote 8, we have never alleged it, 
that is, included it in a consent order or litigation).  This, in turn, provided for their 
response.  The story is transparently untrue. The company representatives 
(lawyers) may have said "You can't prove it", but it is highly unlikely that they said 
"nyeh nyeh nyeh.". This is a derisive expression, used primarily by children, 
whose talk tends to be more primal, less polite and circumlocutionary than that of 
lawyers, less cautious, less littered with vague, noncommittal forms of indirection.  
It points to some weakness or inability on the part of the recipient in relation to 
the speaker.10  Paula is telling a generic story, capturing the essence of what 
supposedly occurred.  The story is, so to speak, about what "really" happened 
(repeatedly), not what actually happened.  The company representatives 
challenged and implicitly derided them. This adds an additional incentive for 
including the charge. Not only can we do something new, something that we 
have wanted but been unable to do in the past, but we can meet their challenge. 
In the talk preceding the story, Paula mentioned "circumstantial evidence," 
suggesting that they have suspected this violation for some time.  She says that 
now they have irrefutable evidence.  The story  adds interactional elements—this 
is what we told them and this is how they responded.  It translates a set of bare 
facts into the realm of social relations, and this provides for a new set of 
motivations.  But the story itself is abstract, in the sense that it is generic; it is a 
fictional representation of actual occurrences.  Any accurate account of an actual 
occurrence would have certain disadvantages.  First, it would be more equivocal, 
                                                
10 Although this is a common expression, familiar to most or all speakers of (at 
least) American English, it is absent from most dictionaries, and a quick internet 
search turned up surprisingly few usages of the expression in its derisive sense.  
Here are a couple: 
Michael Kinsley article in Slate (March 17, 2000) titled "Nyeh Nyeh Nyeh", 
repudiating Salon's negative claims about Slate, and claiming that Slate is in 
better financial condition than Salon. 
An internet posting on Nuklear Power Forums, dealing with refusal to take pills 
that his Mom gives him, is titled "you can't make me! nyeh nyeh." 
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full of distracting elements and arguable meanings.  The generic story strips 
away the inessentials and highlights the essence.  Second, any actual 
occurrence is unique and possibly atypical.  Paula's story, by contrast, represents 
a general state of affairs—"this is what they do" rather than "this is what some 
particular company representative did."  Of course, the generic story has a 
particular weakness—it never happened. 
The story is a part of "what is being done" (Sacks 1992, Stokoe and 
Edwards 2006) in this setting.  It provides another motivation for pursuing this 
charge.  Furthermore, it is designed for specific recipients (Sacks 1992, Schegloff 
1972), with specific tasks and concerns, and for a specific setting.  It is not the 
sort of story that we would expect to hear, e.g., from a lawyer in court.  It does 
not occur as an isolated item  but rather enlivens, as well as adding to, the prior 
exposition; which is to say, it is incorporated into a sequence of talk. 
We might also note a change in Paula's rhetorical style as she tells her 
story.  Instead of the more formal, lawyerly talk which precedes and follows, she 
uses a casual, even slangy style, including not only the "nyeh"s but also "you 
know we go," "c'mon," "they go," and "ahha".  (It is also notable that "you can't 
prove it" goes with "nyeh nyeh nyeh" in a way that "you can't produce a 
preponderance of evidence" does not.  "Nyeh nyeh nyeh, you can't produce a 
preponderance of evidence" violates what Ervin-Tripp (1971) has called rules of 
co-occurrence.  Her own example is "How's it going, Your Eminence?") The story 
is thus marked as a special genre of talk.  Perhaps this adds to the impression 
that we are talking here about something more personal than just law 
enforcement, something that involves our potency and dignity. 
"You can't prove it," I would argue, implicates (in this context at least) that 
"it" is true, that is, that the company did in fact ask applicants about their marital 
status.  Rather than use the Gricean maxims (Grice 1975), I will make my 
argument using the notion of "response priority (Bilmes 1993)11:  If X is the first 
                                                
11 My reasons for preferring response priority are covered in Bilmes 1993.  In 
short, the relevant Gricean maxim of Quantity ("make your contribution as 
informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange; do not make 
your contribution more informative than is required") has two notable problems—
the lack of specificity inherent in "the current purposes of the exchange" and the 
absence, in many cases, of criteria for deciding which of several possible 
"contributions" is most informative.  The second of these problems is not relevant 
for what I am calling type 1 orderings (see below), and therefore not relevant in 
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priority response, then any response other than X (including no  response) 
implicates that X is not available or is not in effect, unless there is reason to 
suppose that it has been withheld.  When one makes a claim that is one of a 
series of  possible claims of a certain type, the strongest or most extreme claim 
in the series gets first priority mention.  Given the mention of some claim, it will 
be understood that more extreme claims are not available. 
Here is an ordered set of responses to an accusation: 
1. You can't prove it. 
2. It might not be true.12 
3. It isn't true. 
This series constitutes what I have called a type 1 ordering (Bilmes 1993), 
in that (3) logically implies (2), which, in turn, logically implies (1).  These 
responses are ordered by strength.  The strongest (what Drew (1985) called the 
"maximal") response has priority.13  If that is not available, the second strongest 
                                                                                                                                            
the present case, since each successive item is clearly more informative than the 
prior ones.  "The current purposes of the exchange" proviso, though, presents a 
problem. It might be argued that, since the purpose of the exchange, from the 
company representatives' point of view, is derision, "you can't prove it" is as 
informative as is required; but the derisive nature of this response is based on its 
implicature.  Thus, the Gricean analysis seems to produce a kind of logical 
circularity.  If the company representatives have said as much as is required, but 
not more, there should be no implicature that more extreme or informative 
alternatives are not available.  But, if there is no such implicature, then "you can't 
prove it" is not sufficient for the current purposes of the exchange, i.e., derision.  
Response priority, to some significant extent, avoids these pitfalls, in part by 
emphasizing cultural scales, and by the requirement to choose the most extreme 
item, although this may need to be scaled back in certain situations.  What 
makes response priority different from Gricean implicature (including “Horn 
scales”) is: 1. It is based in the use of actually occurring talk, rather than starting 
from theory and then inventing examples to support the theory.  2.  It shifts the 
emphasis from informativeness to culturally-based notions of extremity or 
maximality.  3.  It considers utterances within their sequential contexts. 
12 To be understood as meaning that the possibility that it is false cannot be 
nullified, i.e., that there is an actual possibility that it is not true. 
13 On this point, we might note that, whereas "proof" implies preponderance of 
evidence, the reverse is not true.  To say "we have a preponderance of 
11 
has priority, and so forth.  So, for example, if (3) is available, if they know that the 
applicants volunteered marital status information, it is expected that they will say 
it.  If, instead of (3), they say (2), they allow an implicature that (3) is not 
available, and, if they say (1), the implicature is that neither (2) nor (3) is 
available.  It is to be noted that "you can't prove it" is an out-of-court response 
(as, of course, is "nyeh nyeh"); that is (and I am asserting this on the basis of 
intuition only), a defendant would not offer such a response in court precisely 
because the implicature might influence the judge or jury.14 
But the implicatures consequent upon priority responses, like Grice's 
conversational implicatures, can be cancelled, and that is what the company 
representatives in the story proceed to do, by saying "it could have been 
volunteered".15  In other words, they "upgrade" their response from (1) to (2).16  
(However, the "nyeh nyeh nyeh" seems to suggest that they do not really believe 
this.)  Paula replies, "c'mon it wasn't volunteered.". "C'mon" proposes that they 
know perfectly well that it wasn't volunteered.  At this point, the priority response 
is something on the order of "We think that perhaps it was."  That is, when 
someone contradicts you, disagree, or risk the implicature that you can't, or, for 
some reason, won't.17  In this instance, they do not repeat their claim that the 
marital status information could have been volunteered.  They reduce their 
                                                                                                                                            
evidence" suggests that we do not have proof.  Proof, therefore, gets first priority 
mention. 
14 The legal profession constitutes a "community of practice" Lave and Wenger 
1991, Wenger 1998), with its own discursive usages.  It is therefore conceivable 
that "you can't prove it" does not carry the same implicatures for lawyers as for 
laymen.  However, I see no reason to think that this is so in the present case.  
The discursive context (especially "nyeh nyeh" and "c'mon it wasn't volunteered") 
supports my interpretation. 
15 They mention ninety-nine percent of the cases.  Presumably, a violation rate of 
one percent is insufficient to demonstrate either intentional flouting of the law or 
negligence.  How many, then, does it take for the company to be held 
responsible?  How many before Paula could say "we proved it"?  There doesn't 
seem to be any formula for this. 
16 Note that, in doing this, they come very close to explicitly stating the third 
logical principle: If p might be untrue, then it is necessarily unproven. 
17 See Bilmes 1988, 1995.  Also, Atkinson and Drew (1979) on denials in 
response to accusations. 
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response to "nyeh nyeh you can't prove it," thus allowing the implicature that 
even they don't believe it was volunteered.  (They also reduce their "nyeh"s by 
one.  The significance of this is not clear to me, but two is usually the minimum.)  
This adds to the derisive effect, especially since they could have at least 
pretended to believe that the information could have been volunteered.  They 
have the luxury of not needing to dissimulate.  They were willing, in effect to 
grant that they knew the charge was true, making the FTC appear ineffectual.  
They were, Paula is suggesting, mocking us. 
What Paula actually says in lines 7-9 is: 
 
(2) 
7.   Paula:  =You know we go c'mon it wasn't volunteered and 
8.        they go nyeh nyeh you can't prove it. (.5) well 
9.        ahha we proved it. 
. 
 
There is an issue here, in this case somewhat theoretical, in that Paula 
does not provide end quotes.  In some farfetched grammatical sense, the 
company representatives could have said "well ahha we proved it.". Of course, 
no competent member would understand it this way, but sometimes where a 
quotation or other discursive unit ends and the speaker's present voice resumes 
is problematic.  This may be why we supply children with end markers, such as 
"They lived happily ever after," to let them know that the story is over and the 
next thing said is not to be heard as part of the story.  In a recent paper (Bilmes 
2009), I mentioned how difficult it was for me, with my limited linguistic/discursive 
competence, to make out the boundaries of quotations in Northern Thai villagers' 
reports.  In the case at hand, though, there is no ambiguity.  This is due primarily 
to the semantic content.  It would make no sense for the company 
representatives to say "well ahha we proved it," whereas it makes perfect sense 
for Paula to say it.  We might also note the preceding .5 second pause.  In 
addition, there may be a subtle change in voicing, although I will not try to 
describe or analyze that here.  
Paula's "well ahha" sets up "we proved it" as a counter to "you can't prove 
it," a meeting of the challenge.  "Well" is a multifunctional discourse marker; one 
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of its functions is to preface contrasts and disagreements (Pomerantz 1984).18  
Paula's "ahha" is more or less the equivalent of Archimedes' "eureka," an 
exclamation of delight at a new and noteworthy achievement, a solution to a 
previously intractable problem.  It marks the climax and conclusion of the story.  
It can also be understood as a triumphal retort to the company lawyers' taunting, 
and more specifically to "nyeh nyeh." 
 
4.  STORY STRUCTURE 
 Paula’s story is not placed in the sequential environment described by 
Sacks (1974).  There is no preface and no uptake, except for “huh huh” at line 71 
(see appendix).  It also does not fit into the dichotomy proposed by Schegloff 
(1997) between stories "which themselves launch a sequence and those which 
are 'responsive' " (103).  The story is not marked as such; it is simply a part of, 
embedded in, her ongoing talk.  It is connected to the previous talk by “and,” as 
though it was just another point she was making.  When she completes the story, 
there is a .5 second pause but no uptake, although the "huh huh" seems to 
anticipate the ending of the story.  (The lack of more elaborate or expressive 
uptake may be due to the fact that the climax—"we proved it"—is not news to the 
recipients.) She then goes on to continue the argument she was in the course of 
constructing before she began the story.  So, although she leaves open (but 
does not pursue) the option of having the story appreciated as a story,19 she also 
has the option, which she ultimately takes, of treating it as simply another point in 
her argument. 
The story has, roughly speaking, a five-part structure: 
 
1. We said.... 
2. They replied.... 
3. We said.... 
4. They replied.... 
5. We proved it. 
 
                                                
18 On prefatory "well," see also Owen 1981, Schegloff and Lerner 2009 and 
references cited therein. 
19 She could, but did not, have pursued this option by, e.g., offering an evaluation 
(Jefferson 1978), or, more directly, by addressing a question to the recipients. 
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Item (1) is an allegation, and (2) is a response to that allegation.    In the 
conversation analytic literature, accusations are paired to acknowledgment of 
guilt or denial (Atkinson and Drew 1979).  "You can't prove it," however, is 
neither. It is, nonetheless, a response that is properly and typically paired to an 
accusation.  By "typically," I mean not that it is the typical response but that, if it 
occurs, typically it is in response to an accusation.  Thus, if we hear "you can't 
prove it," we can ordinarily infer that the preceding utterance has been 
understood as an accusation.  Like silence (i.e., no response), "you can't prove it" 
may, if nothing further is added, be taken to implicate that the accusation is 
accurate, but as refusing to make that stance "official."  But the two--no response 
and "you can't prove it"--are not equivalent. The latter is defiant; while it implicitly 
acknowledges that the allegation may be true, it explicitly denies that the 
allegation has, or will ever have, legal standing as a fact.  "You can't prove it," in 
effect, bifurcates truth--it implicitly accepts the "ordinary" truth (what I have called 
the "mere truth") of the claim that they have been committing a violation, while 
explicitly denying that the claim is legally true.  It is not a legal fact until it is 
proven by means of conclusive evidence.  
Item (2), the response, has two subparts--"you can't prove it" and "it could 
have been volunteered."  The second part is an assertion, the first item in what 
turns out to be a disagreement sequence. (3) is the disagreement.  As I have 
already suggested, the first priority response to disagreement is further 
disagreement.  If one fails to argue with a disagreeing response, it may be 
understood that one cannot disagree, that is, that one cannot come up with a 
credible counterargument (Bilmes 1988, 1995).  Or, perhaps, that one can but is 
deliberately allowing the previous assertion to stand.  That is what happens here; 
the company representatives, for whatever reason, decline to contradict the 
assertion that the information was not volunteered, as well as the suggestion that 
they are aware that the information was not volunteered.  Thus, in (4), they 
merely reassert that "you can't prove it." 
Item (5) is the denouement of the story.  It is different from the rest of the 
story in that it does not recount what we said to them or they to us.  It goes 
beyond "mere words."  The story is one of conflict and resolution.  We made a 
claim; they defied us; we were triumphant.  They said "you can't," but we did.  
"We proved it" is matched to their words ("you can't prove it") in a perfect 
contrast.  The story ends with a clear and conclusive victory.  It is complete.  
There is nothing more to be said.  
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The structure of this story may be further clarified by dividing it into two 
subsections.  The basic story is: 
 
1. We said, you did X, which is illegal. 
2. They said, you can't prove it. 
3. We proved it. 
 
I call this the basic story because the other section consists of adding an 
assertion and then subtracting that same assertion: 
 
1. It might have been volunteered. 
2.  It wasn't volunteered. 
3.  (Implicit acknowledgment, by repeating only "You can't prove it.") 
 
The second structure is inserted into the first. It seems to be a way of 
emphasizing the separation between truth and proof, by introducing and then 
rejecting the possibility that there was no violation or that the company was 
unaware of a violation.  There is, ultimately, no mitigating addendum to "You 
can't prove it."  Instead of a story with an (uncancelled) implicature, we get a 
story with an implicature and a failed attempt at cancellation, an implicature 
which has, so to speak, stood the test. 
It should be noted that the distinction between the-truth-as-everyone-
knows-it and the-truth-as-provable-in-court is a feature of P's story.  It is not at all 
clear that the company representatives actually did, or would, acknowledge, even 
implicitly, that applicants were asked about their marital status.  Here is an 
excerpt from earlier in the meeting: 
 
(3) 
1.  M:  You're forgetting two things (1) and that is that 
2.  you know we went through all of 'em (1) and virtually 
3. every application has marital status on 'em ev[en 
4.  B:                                                                           [It 
5.  means nothing. 
6.  M:  Even in those cases where they granted loans (1)  
7. they were unsecured. 
8.  B:  That means nothing. (2) 
9.  M:  That means they got unsecured loan and they asked  
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10. marital status [(**)20 
11. B:                        [Doesn't mean that they asked marital  
12. status.  It means that at some point somebody told  
13. them °marital status°. 
  . 
  . 
  . 
32. M. But not ninety-five percent of them. 
((At this point, Ben changes the topic.)) 
 
 In this segment, Ben insists that the information on marital status that 
appears on the application forms could have been volunteered.  It would, 
presumably, not be incredible if the company lawyers made the same claim (but 
see M's comment in line 32).  But my interest here is in Paula's story, not in what 
actually happened or could have happened.  The story is "better" if they implicitly 
admit that the applicants were asked about their marital status.  It is better in the 
sense that there is a clear line between the mere truth and what is provable, and 
this gives an edge to their derision.  We all know it is true, and still you can't 
prove it.  At the same time, by leaving the companies' admission of guilt at the 
level of implicature, P avoids the explicit (and obviously untrue) claim that they 
have admitted their culpability. 
 
5.  THE PLACE OF PROOF 
Paula's story leads us to some general observations about proof as a 
socially organized, discursive object.  Proof--that is, the word and its variants, as 
well as the discursive and other demonstrations that constitute proof--has its 
place, not just any place, in stories, in conversation, and in realms of social 
activity.  Since I am unable to locate in the literature studies of the sequential 
aspects of "proof" and its variants in conversation, I will base my observations in 
this regard on a general, conversation analytic derived knowledge of how 
conversation works, and on my own data. Although this paper is not primarily 
about proof in conversation generally but about how the notions of proof and 
truth are deployed in a particular story, the following discussion can be read as 
an opening of the topic for further examination. 
                                                
20 Each asterisk represents approximately one-half second of untranscribable 
talk. 
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We must distinguish between scientific and legal proofs, since they are, in 
interactional terms, and in other ways as well, very different kinds of phenomena 
(which is not to deny that scientific proof, or at least assertion based on scientific 
proof, has come to play an increasingly important role in legal cases).  In science 
and mathematics, a proof is simply a validation of the truth of an assertion.  That 
is, one makes a still unproven assertion about the nature of things or the 
implications of an axiomatic system, and then one attempts to prove that 
assertion to be true.  In the legal context, a proof is also a demonstration of the 
truth of an assertion, but not just any assertion.  A legal proof demonstrates, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the truth of an allegation, an assertion that someone 
did something illegal, or the truth of an assertion that supports the allegation.  
(The defendant need not prove anything, since the burden of proof lies with the 
accuser.)  So, a (legal) proof follows an allegation, which, in turn, is based on the 
existence of a law.21 Twenty-four of thirty-five testers were asked about their 
marital status, but, if this were not a violation of the law, the inquiry might not be 
notable or mentionable.  The law "constructs" the violation.  Moreover, a fact 
does not constitute a proof until someone takes it as such.  Proof, that is, is a 
member's phenomenon.  More generally (if I may, for a moment, wax 
philosophical), nothing is true or false until there is some reason for declaring it 
true or false. 
At any rate, in legal as well as certain other contexts, a proof follows an 
allegation.  When a lawyer speaks of a possible violation of the law, particularly 
in connection with a court case, the word "proof," or one of its variants, is likely to 
occur.  Here are some illustrations: 
 
(4) 
1.  P:  ...we're gonna keep the information out of the ha:nds of the creditors (1)  
2.       where they don't need to know it (2) and (1) by: um (1.5) so the plaintiffs  
3.       a:nd the government aren't put to the test of trying to prove that it was  
4.       considered. 
 
                                                
21 Sometimes, in order to avoid "giving away the game," a proof will precede the 
assertion that it proves.  This, however, will never be the case with the central 
allegation, since that is, to begin with, the occasion for the legal proceeding. 
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In this case, it is known that a violation has occurred.  The question is 
whether it is necessary to prove that there was injury to consumers in order to 
impose civil penalties. 
 
(5)  
1.  B:  All we have is the company's admission that they have a (1) fo:rm that   
2.       they don't have any procedure for dealing with the situation if it ever arises 
3.       and we have to prove (1.5) that it has arisen. 
 
(6) 
1.  L:  Y'mean no examples have ever happened? 
2.  J:  Not no none to my knowledge. 
3.  L:  How yo gonna prove it in a district court. (10) Y- balls in your court.  How  
4.       are you gonna prove it in a district court I repeat. 
 
(7) 
1.  L:  what I would do: (,) in that section is just to make real sure you don't (1)  
2.       seem to be suggesting that we can prove a violation: by inference. (1)  
3.       Make it real clear that (,) what we would do: is: go out and get (.) instances 
4.       in which (1) that's happened. 
 
 These cases deal with the problem of weak evidence that a violation of a 
particular regulation has occurred at all.  The company has admitted inadequate 
procedures but there is no hard evidence that these inadequacies led to actual 
violations.  In all of these examples, the existence of a violation or possible 
violation leads to a mention of proof.22 
 When a lawyer offers a proof, someone is in trouble.  Proofs do not, 
however, always and necessarily follow allegations. A proof is occasioned by a 
denial or refusal to admit the truth of the allegation by the accused party.  This 
arrangement is based on the assumption that people do not normally confess to 
wrongdoing or illegal action unless they know themselves to have done wrong or 
                                                
22 These extracts are drawn from legal conversations, in which references to 
proof and evidence are more likely to occur than in "ordinary" conversation.  
Nevertheless, these are conversations, as opposed to more constrained variants 
of verbal interaction, such as courtroom talk. 
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broken the law.23  Therefore, a free and voluntary admission of guilt is ordinarily 
sufficient to establish guilt, and there is no need to offer proof following such an 
admission. 
Proofs have their proper place in conversation as well as in courtrooms.  
There are inappropriate times to offer proofs, as well as times when proof is 
demanded.  If, for example, a speaker attempts to offer a proof after an 
uncontested assertion, his recipient may cut him off simply by pointing out that no 
one has contradicted him.  There are also inappropriate times to ask for proof.  
This is easily enough demonstrated by asking people to provide evidence in 
support of their most commonplace assertions.  Garfinkel (1964) performed a 
series of related "exercises," calling into question "what everyone knows," the 
results of which were invariably confusion and disruption, even anger.  In both 
legal and everyday settings, the occasion for proof is that the relevant assertion 
has not been accepted, and there are some assertions that must be accepted, 
even if they are not common knowledge.  If, for example, one were to ask a 
person in a store for service and that person replied "I don't work here," one 
would not ordinarily ask for proof.
                                                
23 An exception: in conversation,  persons might falsely "confess" to illegal 
behavior as a form of boasting, a way of claiming daring, for instance, but they 
would not be expected to do so if such confession would subject them to serious 
negative sanctions.  Of course, there is ample evidence that sometimes, 
frequently under pressure, people will confess to crimes that they have not 
committed (Leslie 2011). 
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Proof may be offered to show that what might be the case is so or that, as 
in our story, what everyone already knows to be the case is so.  There is a 
culturally specific ordering in this arrangement.  That which is informally known to 
be true may not be true for all purposes.  However, that which is formally proven 
is true for all purposes24  I say that this ordering is culturally specific because we 
have evidence that it is not universal.  Among the Dou Donggo of Indonesia, it is 
possible to prove, for formal, legal purposes, that what everyone knows not to be 
the case is so.  Just (1986) describes a case in which a woman proves that she 
was attacked by presenting as evidence a torn blouse and a heavily medicated 
face.  Everyone knows that there was no attack, that the accused did not tear the 
blouse, and that there are no injuries under the medication.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence stands as proof, and the accused is forced to apologize and pay a fine.  
Proof here is a way of establishing a "fact" for some particular purpose or arena.  
In philosophical terms, an assertion is either true or false (or, in some logics, 
indeterminate), but, in social terms, it may be true or false for some particular 
purpose.  It is our notion, but not the Dou Donggo's, that matters that are proven 
are true for all purposes.  For the Dou Donggo, "You can't prove it" may not have 
all the same implications that it does for us. 
The relationship between proof and occasion is a reflexive one.  Proofs 
are appropriately demanded or offered under certain circumstances, on certain 
occasions; on the other hand, the fact of such a demand or offer may be 
significant in the definition of the occasion.  However, a proof (except perhaps a 
scientific/mathematical proof) has few if any formal characteristics by which it can 
be identified.  Rather, it is identified by its place in a sequence of talk.  A 
statement or set of statements gains its character as proof, unless explicitly 
represented as such, only by its relation to some previous or subsequent 
utterance, and any appearance or statement has the potential to be claimed as 
proof in relation to some particular assertion.  (The same is true of other 
conversational objects, such as answers; an answer is identifiable as such only 
by its relation to a question.)  A proof properly occurs only in certain sequential 
environments, and its occurrence in such environments is what makes it 
identifiable as proof.  The same might be said for evidence in general, a proof 
being merely that subset of evidence which is conclusive.  A fact is evidence 
                                                
24 This is not entirely accurate.  A formal proof may be negated for legal purposes 
if the evidence used was illegally obtained. 
21 
when it is interpreted and accepted as supporting an assertion.  And, of course, 
one can argue, as in segment 3, about whether a fact counts as evidence.  
In segment 3, Ben says twice that Mary's proffered evidence "means 
nothing."  He is clearly not claiming that what she said has no interpretable 
meaning.  Rather, he is saying that the facts she offers, while they may be true 
(he does not dispute them), do not constitute evidence of a violation.  Ben's 
objection is contingent on his seeing Mary's assertion as (claimed) evidence, and 
this understanding is in turn reliant on the fact that her assertion is made in 
relation to an earlier claim (not included in the transcript) that the company 
committed a violation. 
In the story, Paula says "we proved it" in response to the challenge posed 
by the company lawyers.  There is another occurrence of (a slight variant of) "we 
proved it", quoted in footnote 8.  Paula is talking to the staff attorneys, who are 
actually writing the memo, about how the discussion of this violation should be 
presented: 
 
"…we pursued it in this case because (.5) all –we've never alleged it (.8) we 
belie:ve that it's a common industry practice (.) it's very difficult to pro:ve (.) ... we 
have ((thumps table)) been able to prove it…." 
 
Here, too, "we have been able to prove it" has a triumphal feel.  Note the 
emphasis on "have" and the thump, which might be compared to "ahha" in her 
story.  And, again, "we have been able to prove it" is presented as a contrast (to 
"it's very difficult to pro:ve").  But the challenge is purely a legal one—proving 
something despite the difficulties.  There is no interactional element and no 
derision.  What I especially want to note, though, is the way in which proof in 
each of these cases is sequentially motivated.  In the story, proof is occasioned 
by the fact that we have been telling them that they are committing a violation.  In 
the second case, it is occasioned by mention of our belief that they are 
committing a violation.  And, "we proved it" is occasioned, in each case, by a kind 
of challenge to our ability to prove it. 
The situation, as presented in Paula's story, is that both parties know that 
the allegation is true, but, since the companies refuse to admit to it, the FTC will 
have to produce proof in order to make the fact of the violation legally actionable.  
And proof requires evidence which is explicit and unambiguous.  This state of 
affairs has its parallels in other sorts of situations.  During the congressional 
hearings on the Iran-Contra affair, Vice-Admiral John Poindexter made famous 
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the phrase "plausible deniability" (see Bogan and Lynch 1989 for extended 
discussion).  The notion was that, although the President may well have known 
the details of the affair, Poindexter refrained from discussing it with him, so that 
his (the President's) knowledge could not be proven.  Another example: Bateson 
(1972) suggests that messages communicated nonverbally are more believable 
than verbal messages, because nonverbal behavior is less subject to conscious 
control.  "When boy says to girl, 'I love you,' he is using words to convey that 
which is more convincingly conveyed by his tone of voice and his movements; 
and the girl, if she has any sense, will pay more attention to those accompanying 
signs than to the words" (412).  There is no doubt some truth to this, but it is also 
the case that sometimes only a verbal declaration will do.  No matter how deep 
and passionate one's gaze, one may be required at some point to say "I love 
you" in so many words.  This puts one "on record."  Nonverbal messages are 
deniable in a way that explicit words are not.  Words are more easily reproduced 
and their meanings more easily defined than gestures, facial expressions, or 
voice quality.25 
The same can be said for implicature.  Implicature is, generally, or at least 
frequently, not adequate for official purposes.26  To say "You can't prove it" is to 
suggest guilt, yet it is not a statement of guilt nor even a statement of probable 
guilt.  "You can't prove it" suggests guilt through certain understandings we have 
about the way people behave.  He did not say that he was guilty, but he did not 
say that he was innocent either, which is what would be relevant and expectable 
if he were in fact innocent.  In the end, if he turns out to be innocent, we cannot 
say that he lied but merely that he said less than or other than what was relevant 
and expectable under the circumstances.  There is a sort of violation here, but it 
is one of convention and sociality. 
Conversation analysts use the word "official" to designate that which is 
actually and explicitly said.  This use of "official" does not refer to the legal or 
bureaucratic status of the message but simply to the denotations of the uttered 
                                                
25 Conley (1982: 43-44, cited in Brannigan and Lynch (1987) points out that 
appeals courts do not consider paralinguistic features of testimony, since such 
features are not recorded in court transcripts. 
26 So, for instance, juries are specifically enjoined from drawing the obvious 
implicature from "taking the fifth."  Nevertheless, this is a complex matter, about 
which, I have discovered, even legal scholars are uncertain.  Apparently, though, 
much depends on a determination of intention.  
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words, as against what may be implicated or connoted or otherwise suggested.  
An official message is palpably factual; it is quotable.  It is one's word and not 
one's tone, wink, or grin, not what one may be hinting at or leaving out, which is 
one's bond.  As Drew (1984) points out, though an inquiry, such as "What are 
you doing?", may, in certain circumstances, project an invitation, officially it is an 
inquiry and nothing more.  If an accused says "You can't prove it," implicating 
guilt, and then turns out to actually be innocent, the accuser has no grounds for 
protest.  If this distinction between official and unofficial messages allows for the 
promotion of such sociable goals as face-saving,27 it also allows for deception 
and derision.  It allows the companies in Paula's story to imply that they know 
very well that they have committed a violation and yet to refrain from actually 
admitting to one.  It is this disparity between their official and unofficial stances 
that gives their behavior its distinctive interactional force. 
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APPENDIX 1 
P:  He: um (2) he made the poi:n:t (.5) Tim made the point that (1) uh he didn't 2 
mind (1.5) u:m (.5) tagalong issues I agree that this sentence (.5) gives two c- 3 
contradictory messages ˙hhh but the idea here was to say: (.5) this is (1) this 4 
is not the essence of the case (.5) this is not the reason: (.5) the sole reason 5 
why we're suing or even the principal reason (.5) why we're proposing to sue 6 
(.5) XYZ ((loan company)) (.5) and Tim sai:d (.5) that he: di- (.5) that it was 7 
fine not to drop those issues (.5) that is (.5) if he says he doesn't want any 8 
more form cases in kay oh ((KO)) three (.5) David's question to him (.5) was: 9 
(.5) what if (we) ha:ve (.5) a goo:d (.5) uh: (.5) uh: harrassment a third party 10 
contact which (.5) the kind of case you do wa:nt (.5) and it also happens that 11 
they had lousy forms (.5) and Tim said leave the form counts in: ˙hhh but just 12 
(.5) you've gotta be sure that in your presentation to the Commission you 13 
don't confuse the Commission and the Bureau Director into thinking this is 14 
just yet another  forms case (.5) ˙hhh applying (.5) and and that seemed to 15 
make a lot of sense applying that to this situation (.5) I felt that it was 16 
important that we no:t (1) that we distinguish between (.5) the seriousness of 17 
the allegations: (.5) um (1) and I: (.5) in looking at this sentence again I (.5) I 18 
agree that there's a bit of a problem (.5) we're (.5) trying to (.5) to both (1) 19 
anticipate the argument tha:t (1) this isn't (1) the sort of thing that generates 20 
the kind of really clea:r consumer injury (.5) that we should sue XYZ  (.5) or 21 
that we should bring this case for that reason (.5) but at the same time (.5) we 22 
think it's: no:t (.5) irrelevant (nor) technical (*) picky: 23 
H:  Um hm 24 
P:  or whatever I[ts 25 
H:                       [(I think) we should say is that although this this kind of violation 26 
does not result in (1) uh: the (.5) consumer injury (1) that: um: (1) occurs: in: 27 
(.5) the other (1) u:m (1) items in this case (1) uh: 28 
?:  Clear consumer injur[y 29 
H:                                  [(Yeah) cle[ar consumer injury 30 
P?:                                                  [Direct consumer inj[ury 31 
H:                                                                                   [Direct consumer injury 32 
(5.) u:m (.5) that nonetheless (.5) is: a: (1) uh: (.5) an important (.5) uh: (.5) 33 
element of the case (3) 34 
P:  Do you think tha:t (.5) sufficiently relegates it to the second (1) tier: of (.5) kind 35 
of a tagalong issue (*) (.5) (*) (.5) 36 
25 
H:  Then you explain why: (.5) why we think that it's important to (.5) uh: be able 37 
to prove uh (.5) this kind of violation [because we think it's= 38 
?:                                                             [Um hm 39 
H:  =it's (.5) it's like (*) as a practical (*) we often have difficulty (detecting it)(3.5) 40 
P:  But I had another (.5) (*) thought (.5) on that one paragraph i- (1) u:m (1.5) 41 
this is basically (1) Ben covered it (.5) last week and that is that we need (.5) 42 
in my view: and I guess (**) to develop (1) uh: (.5) more fully: (1) why: we 43 
think it's important (.5) that (.5) we have a lot of experience with circumstantial 44 
evidence (1) thk (.5) th comp- basically just expanding your argument here 45 
and I have notes on (.5) additional facts you might put in (1) and that instead 46 
of (.5) this is a unique opportunity (.5) it's it's actually (.5) the only way we 47 
have of developing: irrefutable evidence that this has been going on and 48 
we've been telling companies that have been doing it (.5) for years and they 49 
keep saying nyeh nyeh nyeh you can't prove it because it could have been 50 
volunteered in ninety nine percent of the cases 51 
?:  Um hm= 52 
P:  =You know we go c'mon it wasn't volunteered and they go nyeh nyeh you can't 53 
prove it (.5) well [ahha we proved it= 54 
?:                             [huh huh 55 
P:  =(.5) but then the problem is is that we don't talk about the auditing evidence 56 
which is what proves it57 
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